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Summary 
In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, 
the optimal response of non-signatory countries reflects the interaction between three 
potentially opposing factors, the incentive to free-ride on the benefits of cooperation, the 
incentive to expand the demand of fossil fuels, and the incentive to adopt cleaner 
technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a 
game theoretic structure we find that cost-benefit considerations would lead OECD 
countries to undertake a moderate, but increasing abatement effort (in line with the pledges 
subscribed in Copenhagen). Even if emission reductions are moderate, OECD countries find 
it optimal to allocate part of their resources to energy R&D and investments in cleaner 
technologies. International spillovers of knowledge and technology diffusion then lead to 
the deployment of these technologies in non-signatory countries as well, reducing their 
emissions. When the OECD group follows more ambitious targets, such as 2050 emissions 
that are 50% below 2005 levels, the benefits of technology externalities do not compensate 
the incentives deriving from the lower fossil fuels prices. This suggests that, when choosing 
their unilateral climate objective, cooperating countries should take into account the 
possibility to induce a virtuous behaviour in non-signatory countries. By looking at a two-
phase negotiation set-up, we find that free-riding incentives spurred by more ambitious 
targets can be mitigated by means of credible commitments for developing countries in the 
second phase, as they would reduce lock-in in carbon intensive technologies. 
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In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal response 
of non-signatories countries reflects the interaction between three potentially opposing factors, the incentive to 
free-ride on the benefits of cooperation, the incentive to expand the demand of fossil fuels, and the incentive to 
adopt cleaner technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a game 
theoretic structure we find that cost-benefit considerations would lead OECD countries to undertake a moderate, 
but increasing abatement effort (in line with the pledges subscribed in Copenhagen). Even if emission 
reductions are moderate, OECD countries find it optimal to allocate part of their resources to energy R&D and 
investments in cleaner technologies. International spillovers of knowledge and technology diffusion then lead to 
the deployment of these technologies in non-signatory countries as well, reducing their emissions. When the 
OECD group follows more ambitious targets, such as 2050 emissions that are 50% below 2005 levels, the 
benefits of technology externalities do not compensate the incentives deriving from the lower fossil fuels prices. 
This suggests that, when choosing their unilateral climate objective,  cooperating countries should take into 
account the possibility to induce a virtuous behaviour in non-signatories countries. By looking at a two-phase 
negotiation set-up, we find that free riding incentives spurred by more ambitious targets can be mitigated by 
means of credible commitments for developing countries in the second phase, as they would reduce lock-in in 
carbon intensive technologies. 
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1.  Introduction 
Stable coalitions addressing a global externality such as Green House Gases (GHGs) 
emissions are generally small and do not succeed to involve all players of the game [3, 4, 16, 
17, 26].  When cooperation on a global public good is partial, the agreement can fail to be 
environmental effective. On the one hand, the pollution reduction by the coalition might be 
too small compared to the first-best level of abatement. On the other hand, the optimal 
reaction of non-signatory countries might be to increase pollution compared to the case with 
no agreement in place. Whether this is the case or not depends on a number of forces. We 
argue that, when a number of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal 
response of non-members is a mix of at least three potentially opposing factors. 
First, countries have an incentive to free ride on the environmental improvement brought 
about by signatory regions. Because GHGs become uniformly mixed in the atmosphere, the 
perceived damage of emitting one additional ton of carbon is independent of the emission 
source location. A second element that can provide incentives for strategic increases in 
emissions is the global integration of markets. Even if climate policy is enforced only in a 
few countries, demand reduction of fossil fuels driven by the policy can depress the 
international price of these fuels. Consumers and producers not facing climate policies will 
respond with an increase in fossil fuels demand [7, 25, 27]. The literature has referred to this 
as energy market effect.
3 A second mechanism of policy transmission is the international 
trade of energy-intensive goods. By increasing production costs of energy-intensive 
industries, climate policy can reallocate production outside the coalition. Still, the pollution 
haven hypothesis has not found robust evidence and production location choices are only 
                                                 
3 An additional channel of transmission is the international trade of energy-intensive goods. Facing higher 
energy costs, the competitiveness of these industries is reduced and production is reallocated to the countries 
without climate policy. As the international prices of such goods increases, countries outside the abating 
coalition have an incentive to expand their production of these goods and export them to signatory countries. 
The “pollution haven hypothesis” effect is not included in the present analysis.     4
marginally determined by climate policies. In particular, Barker et al. [2] argue that studies 
finding high leakage rates assume that climate policy has strong re-location effects on 
energy-intensive production. However, in practice, this is an unlikely outcome because 
countries adjust policies in order to avoid these effects, for example by exempting trade-
exposed sectors
4. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins [12] show that what actually matters in 
producing carbon leakage is the structure of energy markets and of fossil fuel supply. 
However, they conclude that real world conditions and realistic values for key parameters 
make the risk of significant carbon leakage due to terms-of-trade effects unlikely.  The 
relative importance of the energy market effect compared to the pollution haven hypothesis is 
also emphasised by Böhringer et al. [8]. They show first in an analytical framework and then 
using a numerical Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model that when either the USA 
or the EU reduce unilaterally emissions, carbon leakage is predominantly driven by the 
international energy market effect.  
The damage and energy market effects, as well as the pollution haven hypothesis,  imply that 
countries outside a climate coalition would increase their emissions. However, climate policy 
provides a price signal that triggers innovation in carbon- and energy-saving technologies. 
This is the well-known induced technical change hypothesis. Increasing factor prices give an 
incentive to develop technologies that save the most expensive input. Since markets are 
increasingly more integrated, it is quite unlikely that new technologies developed under the 
stimulus of climate policy remains confined to the policy forerunner countries. Technology 
transfers can occur through climate policies linkages (see for example the work by 
Dechezleprêtre et al. [18] and Seres et al. [37] on technology transfers through the Clean 
                                                 
4 For example, the EU decided to protect trade-exposed sectors by guaranteeing them a free allocation of 
allowances, see the recent Communication released by the European Union “Analysis of options to move 
beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage”, COM(2010) 265. 
   5
Development Kyoto mechanism), but also simply because of trade flows, multinational 
enterprises, and skill-labour mobility (Eaton and Kortum [19,20], Keller, [23]).  
Unilateral climate policy can thus induce technology transfers from the coalition to non-
signatories countries, reducing emissions outside the climate coalition. Using bottom-up 
models of the energy sector, Barreto and Kypreos [6] and Barreto and Klaasen [5] show that 
technology spillovers can induce technical change and emission reduction outside the group 
of countries facing an emission constraint. Using a CGE model that links the energy sector to 
the rest of the general economy, Gerlagh and Kuik [21] estimate the rate of carbon leakage 
associated with the Kyoto Protocol and show that even for moderate levels of technology 
spillover, carbon leakage can become negative. Similar results come also from the theoretical 
literature [22, 41]. 
The two strands of literature on markets effects, on one hand, and on technology spillovers, 
on the other hand, have remained separated, with few exceptions. This is quite surprising as 
there is in fact a close connection between the energy market and the innovation effects. 
Whether a zero-carbon technology is widely adopted depends largely on its price relative to 
that of fossil fuels. In turn, this relative price depends on the stringency of the climate policy,  
the scarcity of fossils, the speed of technology diffusion, and on the price elasticity of energy 
demand.  
To our knowledge, only Hoel [27] discusses these issues jointly, using a simplified analytical 
model. Hoel compares the direct effect of an exogenous cost reduction of a clean substitute to 
fossil fuels with the induced energy market effect. He shows that emissions are more likely to 
increase in the short-run, the higher the elasticity of demand, the scarcer the fossil fuels, and 
the lower the substitution possibilities between clean and dirty substitutes. That paper 
provides very clear intuitions on the interaction between energy market and technology 
effects, but taking the evolution of technical change as given and neglecting the dynamics   6
characterising the climate system. An integrated assessment model with endogenous 
technical change can complement the above analysis and provide more general insights   
because it allows characterising the optimal reaction function of non-signatories under more 
realistic assumptions. 
This is the approach adopted by this paper, which uses a numerically calibrated integrated 
assessment model to generalise some of the considerations on the trade-off between the 
energy markets and the technology effects.  The model chosen is suitable for this analysis 
because it has a game-theoretic set-up where players, regions of the world, choose their 
optimal intertemporal strategies taking in consideration other regions’ reactions. The solution 
of the pollution game is a Nash equilibrium between coalition members playing their best 
response to non-members, which individually adopt their best reply strategy (as in Chander 
and Tulkens [15]). Fossil fuel prices are endogenously influenced by the global use of 
exhaustible resources. In addition, and differently from Hoel [27], technical change 
endogenously accounts for both knowledge and experience international spillovers.  
We start the analysis by looking at partial cooperation between OECD countries, a coalition 
that is interesting in several respects. To date, industrialised countries have been the leading 
innovators. For this reason, the OECD group can be expected to lead the technological 
transition towards lower carbon development pathways while creating more incentives for 
developing countries to join. The central question we investigate is whether the OECD 
coalition can set a target that triggers technological diffusion while keeping the damage and 
energy market effects under control. In other words, is there an “optimal” abatement effort 
that minimises carbon leakage?  To generalise the validity of our results, we explore the 
influence of a number of elements, including the structure of energy markets, energy supply 
and international trade elasticities, substitution possibilities in final production, speed of   7
innovation, composition and differences in climate damages, and the nature and composition 
of the coalition. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates how the energy 
market, technology, and damage effects are described in the numerical model WITCH. 
Section 3 discusses how the  interaction between the three effects determines the optimal 
reaction of non-members to partial cooperation among OECD countries. Because the 
magnitude of each of these effects depends on the effort undertaken by the coalition, Section 
4 investigates the consequences of varying the stringency of the emission objective and the 
composition of the coalition.  In Section 5 the robustness of results is tested across alternative 
model specifications and challenged through extensive sensitivity analysis. A discussion of 
results and their policy implications concludes the paper in Section 6.  
 
2.  Energy market, technology, and damage effects in the WITCH model 
Our analysis is based on the WITCH model, which incorporates a detailed representation of 
the energy sector into an inter-temporal growth model of the economy. This allows 
technology-related issues to be studied within a general equilibrium framework characterised 
by environmental (expected future climate change damages), economic (international energy 
markets), and technology (international spillovers of knowledge and experience) externalities 
(Bosetti et al. [9,10,11]).   
The players of the game are twelve forward-looking regions that cover the global economy. 
They can play either cooperatively (global and partial coalitions can be considered) or non-
cooperatively. In the first case, regions maximise the global social welfare, fully internalising 
environmental and economic externalities. This leads to the first-best optimum. When 
playing a non-cooperative game, regions optimise their individual welfare, taking as given 
each other region’s choice. This is done through an iterative procedure, which is capable of   8
reproducing the outcome of a non-cooperative, simultaneous, open membership game with 
full information, and thus achieve a second-best Nash equilibrium.
5 The non-cooperative 
game can involve only singletons, coalitions of different size, or coalitions of different size 
and singletons. Both singletons and coalitions best-respond to other players’ move, but 
singletons maximise individual welfare while coalition maximises aggregate joint welfare. In 
particular, coalitions evaluate the weighted sum of discounted per capita consumption, with 
weights calibrated to equate marginal utilities across members, the Negishi weights. As the 
model describes both the environmental and technology externalities, cooperation can 
address each of these market failures. In the second stage countries choose their intertemporal 
path of investments. The game is solved backwards. 
In each region n of the model, a social planner maximises welfare Eq.(1) subject to  economic 
constraints below [Eqs. (2)-(11)]: 
 
          ( 1 )  
 
In Eq. 1, U(.) is the utility function of the representative agent,    is per capita 
consumption at time t in region n, and L represents population, which is also the measure of 
labor inputs. R(t) is a discount factor to represent the rate of time preference.  
The regional social planner chooses an entire sequence of consumption levels and 
investments subject to the budget constraint that describes how total final production,  , 
can be allocated to final consumption,  , investments in final goods,  , 
investments in various energy technologies i,   at the unit cost of installation  , 
                                                 
5 The model is solved as a one-shot meta-game. In the first stage countries decide on their participation and 
coalitions are formed.   9
investments in R&D in each of these energy technologies,  , and expenditure on 
fuels, , at unit cost   : 
 
   (2) 
 
where the technologies available i include energy efficiency improvements, EE,  fossil-fuel-
based technologies in power sector, fossil-fuel-based technologies in final use sectors, 
carbon-free technologies in power sector, carbon-free technologies in final use sectors.
6  
  As mentioned above, WITCH specifically incorporates the emission externality, the 
technology externality via international knowledge and experience spillovers, and carbon 
leakage through international energy markets.  
The  climate externality is represented by a damage function, D, that depends on global 
temperature, computed through a simplified climate module. Global temperature ultimately 
depends on global GHGs emissions, . The reduced-form damage function, D, 
accounts for the regional effects of global mean temperature increase on regional Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Because climate change damages have a direct impact on output, 
the net output available for consumption and investments can be different from what actually 
produced, driving a gap between net output available,   and produced gross output, 
:  
 
                                                 
6 Electricity can be generated using fossil fuel based technologies and carbon-free options. Fossil-fuel-based 
technologies include natural gas combined cycle (NGCC), oil- and pulverised coal-based power plants. 
Integrated gasification combined cycle power plants equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS) are also 
modelled. Zero carbon technologies include hydroelectric and nuclear power plants, wind turbines and 
photovoltaic panels (Wind&Solar). The end-use sector uses traditional biomass, biofuels, coal, gas, and oil. Oil 
and gas together account for more than 70% of energy consumption in the non-electric sector. Instead, the use of 
coal and traditional biomass is limited to some developing regions and decreases over time.  First generation 
biofuels consumption is currently low in all regions of the world and the overall penetration remains modest 
over time given the conservative assumptions on their large scale deployment.     10
           ( 3 )  
        (4) 
 
For an increase in temperature below 1.27°C, climate change impacts on GDP can be either 
positive or negative, depending on regional vulnerability and geographic location. Above that 
level, damages are negative throughout the world and increase in a quadratic relationship 
with temperature. Final  gross output,   is produced by combining physical 
capital, ,  energy services,  , and labour , ,using a CES production 
function:  
 
       ( 5 )  
 
 
Labour force  is approximated with (exogenous) population. At each point in time, the 
capital stock accumulates with the perpetual rule: 
 
      ( 6 )  
 
 
Overall technological progress is described by the exogenous dynamics in total factor 
productivity, .   
Whereas there are several options that can be used to decarbonises the power generation 
sector, the non-electric sector features fewer zero-emission options. Although there can be 
some switching from direct energy use to electricity, substitution possibilities are constrained 
by the limited  elasticity of substitution assumed between electric and non electric inputs to 
the production of energy services. The two inputs enter a CES function where elasticity is 
assumed to be equal to 0.5. This low value accounts for path dependencies and lock-in effects 
in existing capital stock.    11
The technology portfolio of both the electric and the non electric sector is not static and it can 
be expanded  by investing in innovation. The WITCH model provides a simple, but 
reasonable representation of the process of innovation as well as of technology diffusion. 
Regions can invest part of their savings to accumulate new knowledge in the energy sector. 
R&D can lead to incremental energy efficiency improvements as well as radical discoveries. 
A first channel of endogenous technological change affects energy intensity. A stock of 
knowledge capital,   augments the quantity of energy services that can be 
produced by each unit of physical energy used,   
 
                      (7) 
 
When enough resources are allocated to dedicated R&D, breakthrough innovation can 
happen
7 making brand new clean technological options economically viable. Once 
technologies are deployed, investment costs decrease further with the learning process that is 
proportional to global adoption. The two stages of innovation and diffusion are combined 
together in a two-factor learning curve specification for investment costs, which are an 
endogenous function of the knowledge stock (Learning-By-Researching) and installed 
capacity (Learning-By-Doing). Learning-By-Researching occurs before the technology 
penetrates the market, while Learning-By-Doing operates when technology deployment 
starts. The general form is described in equation (8): 
  
                                    (8) 
 
                                                 
7 The model simplifies the representation of the innovation process by assuming a deterministic specification.   12
where the investment cost in technologies i at time t depends on the cumulated stock of R&D 
investments,  , and on the cumulated capacity,  , aggregated over the whole 
world. The two exponents, the Learning-by-Doing (LBD) index,  , and the Learning-by-
Researching (LBR) index,  , define the speed of learning. In particular, the rate at which 
investment costs decline each time the cumulative capacity or the knowledge stock doubles
8 
is given by the learning ratios, defined as one minus the progress ratio, 
. While regions when optimising know that 
they can affect costs by investing in R&D, LBD occurs as an external effect.  
For the sake of simplicity we assume two broad types of breakthroughs can occur, one in the 
final use sector and one in power generation.  For example, innovation could introduce a new 
substitute for oil in the transport sector, such as cellulosic biofuels, electric or hydrogen-full-
cell vehicles. Or new power generating technologies might become competitive, such as 
concentrated solar power or advanced nuclear power. Once breakthroughs occur, the uptake 
of the new technologies will not be immediate and complete, but the pace of transition is 
controlled by a penetration limit. Both learning effects influence investment costs in 
breakthrough technologies in the power and final sectors. In the case of more mature options, 
such as wind and solar PV, the contribution of the knowledge stock is negligible, that is 
=0, while the Learning-By-Doing mechanism keeps reducing investment costs. We 
assume that both learning mechanisms are zero in the case of fossil-fuel-based technologies, 
hydroelectric power, and third generation nuclear technologies. 
The innovation externality takes the form of international spillovers of knowledge embodied 
in the energy sector. The dynamic evolution of the knowledge is described the following 
perpetual rule   
                                                 
8 A two time period (corresponding to 10 years) lag is assumed for R&D, to capture the inertia of bringing research to the market.  




where investments in R&D are combined with cumulated stock of existing national 
knowledge,  to account for standing on shoulder effects, and foreign knowledge, 
, to account for international spillovers effect, as described in equation (11):    
 
         (11) 
 
The spillover term depends on the interaction between the countries’ absorptive capacity, 
measured by the ratio of the stock of the country to that of the frontier, and the distance of 
each region from the technology frontier itself. The frontier is represented by the total stock 
of knowledge available in top innovator countries, the OECD, and it is taken as an externality 
by each optimising region. This formulation implies that foreign knowledge has a positive 
contribution to domestic knowledge formation only if the recipient country has a sufficiently 
high absorptive capacity, which is measured in terms of domestic knowledge stock. The 
distance from the technology frontier, which is defined as the gap of each region from the 
international pool of knowledge, plays also a role. The technology frontier consists of 
knowledge capital stocks in different countries, reflecting the idea that there is not a single 
innovator. In this manner, countries in frontier can still benefit from spillovers because of the 
heterogeneity of knowledge capital across countries.  
Finally, the last channel of interaction across regions is that of the international energy 
market. International prices of fossil fuels are determined by the equilibrium between global 
demand and supply. As a consequence, a domestic policy enforced in one region has an   14
impact on consumption and production in other regions as well through the price mechanism. 
International prices endogenously reflect fossil fuels exhaustibility, which is ultimately 
driven by regional consumption. The cost increases with global demand to reflect resource 
scarcity. Four non-renewable fuels are considered: coal, crude oil, natural gas, and uranium. 
A set of reduced-form cost functions accounts for the non-linear  effect of both depletion and 
extraction. Assuming competitive markets, the domestic price   is equal to the marginal 
cost and it depends on the cumulative quantity of fossil fuels extracted,  : 
 
                             (12) 
 
The distinguishing features of the model are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Distinguishing feature of the WITCH model 
key distinguishing feature  WITCH model 
Solution concept 
Intertemporal optimisation (Ramsey‐type growth model) 
Expectations/Foresight  Default: perfect foresight 
Substitution possibilities 
within the macro-economy / 
sectoral coverage 
CES production function of generic final good from primary inputs capital 
and labour and intermediate inputs energy 
Link between energy system 
and macro-economy 
Economic activity determines demand; energy system costs 
(investments, fuel costs, operation and maintenance) are included in 
macro‐economic budget constraint. Hard link, i.e. energy system and 
macro‐economy are optimised jointly.  
Production function in the 
energy system / substitution 
possibilities 
Non-linear substitution between competing technologies for electricity 
generation modelled with CES production functions. Supply curves for 
exhaustible resources.  
Land use  MAC curves for deforestation   15
International macro-
economic linkages / Trade 
Single market for some commodities (permits) 
International spillovers of knowledge (energy R&D) and of experience 
(learning-by-Doing for wind and solar) 
Implementation of climate 
policy targets 
 
Emission caps-and-trade, with different allocation rules across or taxes. 
Banking and borrowing can be switched on/off 
Optimal level of emissions based on Cost Benefit Analysis 
Technological Change / 
Learning 
Global learning-by-Doing for wind and breakthrough technologies in power 
and final sector;  learning-by-Researching  for breakthrough technologies 
with international spillovers of knowledge;  energy efficiency R&D 
investments with international spillovers 
Representation of end-use 
sectors 
Electric (power generation from gas, coal, and oil; coal IGCC on combination 
with CCS, nuclear, hydro, wind, solar), non-electric (final use of coal, oil, 
gas, biomass, first and second generation biofuels), final good sector 
Cooperation vs. non-
cooperation  
Nash equilibrium (non-cooperative) or Pareto equilibrium (cooperative) 
Externalities  Environmental externality (a damage function can be switched on/off), 
international energy markets, technology externalities are not internalised in 
the Nash equilibrium 
Utility   Log utility. Risk aversion coefficient equal to 1. 
Investment dynamics  Capital motion equations, no vintage 
 
 
Although this model represents a step-up over standard integrated assessment modelling that 
normally features only the climate externality, it must nonetheless be recognised that it does 
not thoroughly represent all possible sources of global interaction. More specifically, no 
international trade of capital is assumed and therefore terms-of-trade effects are not 
considered. However, as discussed in the introduction, most of the literature confirms that 
carbon leakage takes place mainly through the international energy market effect [2,8], which 
is fully modelled. Our model captures market failures related to international spillovers only 
in the energy sector, as no general purpose R&D is assumed. No learning is considered for 
known, yet potentially improvable technologies, such as nuclear power and carbon capture 
and storage (CCS). Thus, this exercise provides an account of only some of the most relevant 
sources of global interaction. Finally, each region internalises only the regional externalities 
associated with climate change damages, the accumulation of knowledge, and the use of 
fossil fuels, but not the international ones.    16
The next section explores the issue of carbon leakage when OECD countries play the role of 
climate leaders and choose the optimal level of pollution, knowing that non-OECD countries  
will react optimally. 
 
3 OECD partial cooperation  
Given the numerous sources of global interaction described in the previous sections, the 
implementation of climate policies in a sub-group of countries will inevitably affect the 
behaviour of non-members as well. Non-signatories might react by increasing, decreasing, or 
leaving unchanged their emission. The reaction of non signatories depends not only on the 
interaction between the energy, damage, and technology effects, but also on composition and 
size of the coalition of climate leaders. When the level of ambition of the coalition is high, 
either because the coalition is big or because the perceived damages are large, the energy 
market effect is likely to prevail. In contrast, smaller or less environmentally active coalitions 
might see the technology effect prevail. In addition, what also matters is the nature of the 
decarbonisation pathway followed by the coalition.  In particular, if coalition members 
already have a good performance in terms of energy intensity, emission reduction will need 
to rely on decarbonisation of the energy mix, which means introducing cleaner alternatives 
and expanding the deployment of zero-carbon technologies. Conversely, if the energy 
intensity of the coalition is high, a large margin of reduction will be achieved through energy 
saving measures.  In the case of the coalition considered in this section composed of OECD 
countries, the average energy-output ratio is relatively low and therefore significant 
technology transformation is required even for moderate emission reduction targets. The 
optimal endogenous level of abatement for a coalition reflects the weighting of benefit from 
avoided damage and the costs of mitigation, which in turn is based on innovation 
expenditures, the cost of shifting to more expensive technologies and fuels and towards more   17
efficient ways of production. The cost-benefit criterion is sensitive to value judgements, such 
as the economic evaluation of climate change impacts and the choice of the discount rate. The 
role of discounting and that of cost-benefit analysis in the context of climate change has been 
discussed and documented in several papers as in, among many others, Nordhaus [8], Tol 
[39]
9, Stern [38] and Weitzman [42]. It is still debated whether any discounting at all should 
be associated with very long-term normative analysis, as it is ethically hard to justify that the 
present generation should get a greater slice of the cake, but for the fact that future 
generations might not be there. In this sense, discounting would weigh the likelihood of 
human extinction [36]. In this paper we start by taking a normative perspective and perform 
the analysis by assuming a pure rate of time preference of 0.1%
10. We then investigate the 
effect of a higher discount rate, 3%, and show how this has major impacts on innovation 
strategies. As far as damage is concerned, the central case that we analyse in the following 
pages assumes damage estimates in the mid, high range between UNFCCC’s estimates [40] 
and the values proposed in the Stern Review
11.  
3.1  The optimal OECD Target and the optimal non-OECD reaction 
Given the assumptions just described, the optimal, non-cooperative baseline would result in 
an increase in global average temperature of about 3.4°C above pre-industrial levels in 2100. 
This pattern would lead to a global damage of about 7% of the Gross World Product (GWP in 
2100). Cooperation on emission reduction by the group of OECD countries would slow down 
climate change only slightly, with 0.2°C less warming in 2100.  
                                                 
9 Similar results are shared by Manne and Richels [30], Mendelsohn et al. [31] and Pearce [35]. 
10 We did not adjust the curvature of the utility function to reflect the lower pure rate of time preference and to 
keep the interest unchanged according to the Ramsey rule. As shown in Nordhaus [33], lowering the pure rate of 
time preference and adjusting accordingly the curvature of the utility function leads to a result that is basically 
unchanged from that based on the original parameter value. Instead, we base the experiment on an interest rate 
that is exceptionally low, following a normative approach, to observe the effects and compare them with 
experiments based on a higher pure rate of time preference. The next section will analyse how myopic 
behaviour, modelled with a higher discounting, affects the results. 
11 The chosen damage and a pure rate of time preference are such that global cooperation results in the 2.5°C 
degree target.    18
Cost-benefit considerations would lead the OECD coalition to follow initially moderate 
emission cuts, while effort would increase over time. In 2050, the optimal CO2 emission 
reduction is only 32% (or 34% CO2-eq considering all GHGs) compared to 2005. In absolute 
levels this corresponds to an emission reduction of 4.5 GtCO2 (5.6 GtCO2-eq) compared to 
2005, from 13.8 to 9.4 GtCO2 (from 16.5 to 10.8 GtCO2-eq). It is interesting to note that 
short-run emission reductions fall in the range of the Copenhagen pledges for Annex I 
countries, which largely overlap with the model definition of OECD region. In 2020, the 
optimal emission reduction compared to 2005 is 2%. This increases to 7% and 14% in 2025 
and 2030, respectively. Annex I conditional pledges have been estimated to lead to a 2020 
reduction between 0% and 14.3%, with a median value between 1% and 12.5%, depending 
on the assumptions on LULUCF accounting and the use of surplus emissions units
12.  
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the OECD group’s optimal abatement path (measured as 
emissions with respect to baseline) along with the optimal reaction of non-OECD countries. 
Overall, the non-OECD countries’ reaction is proactive, and their optimal emission path lies 
slightly below baseline. This is a little improvement, when compared the absolute increase in 
emissions in non-OECD countries throughout the century, but still it implies no leakage. 
Only in the very short-run, some leakage occurs, but over time the technology channel 
dominates the damage and energy market effects. 
 
 
Figure 1: Optimal CO2 emission reductions in OECD countries and optimal reaction of non-OECD 
countries through time. GtonCO2 difference of energy-related CO2 emissions compared to non-
cooperative baseline  
                                                 
12 These are the estimates presented in the UNEP Assessment “The Emission Gap Report” which reviewed the 
assessment of the Copenhagen Pledges made by thirteen different models. The report, containing a detailed 
description of the assumptions made in the different cases, is available at 
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Even though non-signatories could free ride on the emission reduction commitment of the 
OECD, they do not have an incentive to do so. This is the result of different factors. First of 
all, the OECD effort is moderate. Most damages occur in non-OECD countries and they are 
not internalised by the OECD coalition, which perceives a modest social cost of carbon. To 
give some perspective, global emissions resulting from the OECD coalition effort are far 
above any stabilisation path, and GHG concentration in 2100 is only 80 ppm less than in the 
non-cooperative baseline. As said above, global mean temperature in 2100 increases up to 3.2 
°C, as opposed to the 3.4°C.  
When abatement is moderate, the influence on international fuel prices is also contained. The 
international price of oil is at most 34%
13 lower compared to baseline and such reduction is 
more than compensated by innovation and deployment of clean technologies. Even if the 
emission reduction is moderate, technology investments in OECD countries increase 
significantly. Expenditure in clean energy R&D grows from 0.05%  to 0.24%,measured as a 
share of GDP, for a total amount of 74 US$ Billion in 2010. A small fraction (2.9 US$ 
                                                 
13 The oil price reduction increases with the level of abatement and it reaches the highest reduction of 34% in 
2100.  
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Billion) is allocated to energy efficiency improvement, while most additional investments are 
dedicated to the development of breakthroughs in the power and final-use sector. These 
investments reduce the costs of breakthrough technologies, which are introduced first in the 
OECD and subsequently, with a time lag of five to ten years, in non-OECD countries. This 
result substantiates the discussion above concerning the nature of the decarbonisation 
pathway and how this determines the strength of the technology effect. Because OECD 
energy-output ratio is already low, even modest emission reduction requires new 
technologies. In addition, OECD countries represent the technology frontier, at least today
14, 
and most R&D expenditure occurs there. Therefore, they represent the  major source of 
knowledge and technology spillovers.  
3.2  The optimal non-OECD reaction: trade-off between the energy, technology, 
and damage effects 
The previous Section discussed how the damage, energy market, and technology effects play 
out in shaping technology cost functions and the optimal response of non-signatory countries. 
In this Section we disentangle the magnitude and the direction of the three factors.  For the 
purpose of this analysis, we compare the optimal solution analysed in the previous section 
with three hypothetical scenarios in which any of the three mechanisms is turned off. This 
should obviously be considered as a purely speculative exercise, as in real life it would be 
obviously impossible to turn off either effect.   
The first of these variations assumes that Learning-By-Researching and Learning-By-Doing 
effects are completely excludable and kept within the coalition. We assume that non-
signatories cannot reap any of the innovation advancements induced by the OECD climate 
agreement. Technology investment costs and energy efficiency in non-OECD countries 
cannot be affected by R&D investments choices and new installed capacity in OECD 
                                                 
14 Consider that the base year of the model is 2005.   21
countries, as in shown in Table 2,  first two rows. We refer to this case as the “no 
TECHNOLOGY effect” case (no TECH), which can be thought of as situation in which 
channels that vehicle international transfers of knowledge and technologies, such as trade, 
FDI, skill-labour migration, patenting in different countries, are for some reasons not 
effective.   
The second case assumes that the OECD reduction in fossil fuel consumption does not 
influence the fossil fuel prices faced by non-OECD countries. They continue to buy energy at 
the same, higher price they perceived in the non-cooperative baseline. We refer to this second 
case as the “no ENERGY MARKET effect” case (no EMKT). Table 2, third row, shows how 
this case has been parameterised.  
Third, we assume that the mitigation of the temperature increase resulting from the action 
undertaken in OECD countries can be excludable and that non-OECD countries continue to 
face the higher temperature increase observed in the non-cooperative baseline. We refer to 
this final case as the “no DAMAGE effect” case (no DAM, Table 2, fourth row).  
 
Table 2: Modelling technology, damage, and energy market effect in the WITCH model  
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Figure 2 reports the resulting change in non-OECD emissions with respect to the non-
cooperative baseline in these three scenarios (no TECHNOLOGY, no ENERGY-MARKET 
and no-DAMAGE cases) as well as the case where all three effects are in active (the Optimal 
case).  Results are shown for high and low discounting. We first concentrate on the low pure 
rate of time preference case (i.e. 0.1%), which is in line with the analysis in the previous 
section (left markers in Figure 2).  
As an indicator of the non-OECD group’ reaction function we plot the aggregate cumulative 
emissions reduction throughout the century with respect to the baseline. When the technology 
effect is turned off, the cost of clean technologies in non-OECD countries is unaffected by 
OECD innovation and technology use. Still, non-OECD countries see the reduced energy 
prices and perceive a lower damage. As a consequence, non-signatories’ emissions are higher 
than in the optimal case because the energy and damage effects are not counterbalanced by 
clean innovation transfers. When the technology effect is silenced, the sign of carbon leakage 
becomes negative.  
Conversely, ruling out the energy market effect implies that in non-signatory countries the 
cost of the fossil-fuel-based technology does not decrease when OECD countries reduce their 
demand, while they still perceive the induced innovation in clean technologies. As a 
consequence, the adoption of the clean options is even more pronounced than in the optimal 
case, as reflected by the even lower cumulative emissions. Finally, when non-OECD 
countries are excluded from the environmental benefits due to the OECD’s action, and they 
perceive the same temperature they would in the absence of any policy, this slightly increases 
returns on energy efficient and clean investments in non-OECD countries. However, the 
relative incentive to adopt the clean and polluting technology does not change as significantly 
as in the no ENERGY MARKET case. The damage effect turns to be the smaller, in this 

















Figure 2: Cumulative CO2 emissions (2010-2100) in non-OECD countries when reacting to the 
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When a higher pure rate of time preference is considered (3%, right markers in Figure 2), the 
direction of each effect does not change, but the magnitude of each of them is largely and 
asymmetrically affected. In order to keep our focus on the reaction of non-signatories we   24
assume the OECD level of emission reduction remain unchanged in the higher discount rate 
case, while focusing on the changes in non signatories’ optimal reaction.
15 High discounting 
significantly shortens the time horizon of the social planners, making the benefits of technical 
change and reduced damage occurring after 2050 irrelevant compared to shorter term costs. 
Damages increase exponentially (see equation 4) and technology benefits take time to 
materialise. New inventions take between ten and five years to reduce investment costs or 
improve energy efficiency (equations 8 and 10). As a consequence, both the damage and the 
technology effects lose significance when the pure rate of time preference is 3%.  The energy 
market effect, which has a shorter term nature, tends to prevail. This is true in both regions. 
OECD countries meet their goal adopting a different strategy. They invest less in innovation 
to bring down the cost of future carbon-free technologies, while spending more later in direct 
mitigation (e.g. substitution) and output contraction.  The effect on technology costs due to 
OECD countries’ myopic behaviour adds to non signatories own myopia  leading to overall 
positive carbon leakage, even in the optimal case when all three effects are at play. It is only 
excluding the energy market effect completely that we can again reverse the sign of carbon 
leakage.  
In the model international spillovers of knowledge and experience are two distinct channels 
(see equation 10 and 8). Therefore, we consider two additional variations and explore the 
relative contribution of each of these two mechanisms. First, we assume that only knowledge 
investments are completely excludable. Think, for example, to a very tight property right 
system. This would affect the timing clean technologies would become competitive, as non-
OECD countries could not benefit from knowledge spillovers nor affect knowledge in the 
coalition. Once a clean technology becomes competitive, though, cost improvements can 
diffuse freely outside the coalition by means of technology transfers. Under this scenario, 
                                                 
15 Had we also considered the effect of a higher discount rate on the OECD countries optimal emission, we 
would have seen an even stronger upward shift in the follower reaction as the lower abatement objective in the 
coalition dilutes the innovation effort even more, resulting in weaker spillovers.   25
non-signatories would benefit from the technological improvements only when they are 
embedded in new technologies that can be exported or transferred, but they cannot reap the 
benefits of enhanced knowledge, which remains within OECD countries. We refer to this 
case as the “no international knowledge spillovers” case (Table 2, first row). In the second 
case, there are knowledge spillovers, but non-OECD countries do not have access to the 
improvement in cost due to learning-by-doing effects following the breakthrough and due to 
the technology adoption in OECD countries. We refer to this case as the “no Learning-By-
Doing” case (Table 2, second row). We find that these two channels similarly contribute to 
emission reduction in non-signatory countries. Excluding either effect leads to an emission 
increase of  about 3% each  (note that the overall effect due to the technology effect is 5%, 
see Figure 2). While the “no Learning-By-Doing” case emphasises the benefits of cost 
improvements following technology adoption, the “no international knowledge spillover” 
case highlights the role of  unintended knowledge diffusion preceding the breakthrough. It is 
important to stress that the model does not consider other barriers that could hinder 
technology adoption such as institutions, governance or access to financial markets, and the 
fact that in some countries technology adaptation might be needed to make the imported 
technology suitable to the local context.  
4. Varying the coalition’s effort  
4.1 Varying  the reduction commitments in OECD countries  
We argued before that damage, energy market, and the technology effects depend on the 
effort undertaken by the coalition and by the decarbonisation pathways followed. In this 
Section we analyse how the reaction of non-OECD countries varies with the stringency of the 
coalition’s target. We analyse 2050 target for the OECD coalition ranging from 20% to 50% 
emission reduction compared to 2005 and identify a window of emission reduction targets 
that triggers proactive behaviour in non-signatory countries.     26
Figure 3, left panel, shows non-OECD cumulative emissions in reaction to different  OECD 
targets. The U-shaped reaction function suggests that for extreme commitments by OECD 
countries, both too loose and too strict, leakage is positive. There exist however an 
intermediate range of targets for which leakage goes to zero or even switch sign. The 
endogenous OECD target from the previous section lies within this intermediate interval (dot 
in Figure 3 left panel).  
 
Figure 3: Reaction function of non-OECD countries: cumulative CO2 emissions (2010-2100) 











































































    
The key determinant of the reaction function shape is the trade-off between the energy market 
and the technology effect. When the coalition target is very loose (less than 30%) the 
abatement effort is achieved mostly by means of energy efficiency and substitution, which, 
being cheaper, are the first measures to be adopted. Conversely, fairly ambitious targets 
(above 35%) exert a positive effect on technology deployment and diffusion, but also imply a 
very deep contraction of fossil fuels demand. Since players are forward-looking, non-OECD 
countries foresee a lower relative oil price path and lock in into a fossil–fuel-based energy 
portfolio.  
In between these two extremes, there is a window of emission reduction targets in which the 
long-run cost of the breakthrough technology is ultimately reduced below that of the dirty   27
substitute. The right panel of Figure 3 illustrates the trade-off between the energy market and 
technology effect. It shows the evolution of the cost of a carbon-free substitute to oil in the 
final-use sector, relative to oil price. When the coalition reduces emissions by 25%, the price 
of this alternative remains high and the clean technology is not adopted in non-signatories. 
When abatement increases to 35%, the technology penetrates also outside the coalition. When 
emissions are reduced by 45%, the decline in the oil price prevails, preventing the diffusion 
of the clean technologies despite its significant cost reduction.  
4.2 Varying the coalition structure 
We have argued that very ambitious unilateral climate policies can be counterproductive 
because countries outside the coalition have the incentive to take advantage of lower energy 
prices and rely more on fossil-fuel-based energy. Section 4.1 showed that, to avoid 
boomerang effects, unilateral climate policies should aim at moderate targets. In addition, 
because OECD countries are already on a path of low energy efficiency, a mild objective 
would be sufficient to induce technological change, without prompting excessive reduction in 
the cost of fossil fuels.  
However, this holds true if non-signatory countries expect never to take any mitigation 
action. Should developing countries anticipate a future credible commitment, this would 
allow more ambitious efforts by the OECD group. We explore two cases, the first in which 
non-OECD do not have specific emission reduction targets, but take part to the international 
carbon market
16 through mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM). 
The second  case assumes no CDM, but a domestic target that stabilises non-OECD 
emissions after 2050. Results indicate that if developing countries fully anticipate the 
forthcoming commitment, in 2050, they will already start modifying their investment strategy 
in the short-run, offsetting leakage. Expectations about future commitments could reverse the 
                                                 
16 We assumed that in this case non-OECD countries do not increase emissions above baseline levels.    28
sign of carbon leakage (Figure 4, right-most bar), while the left-most bar shows the optimal 
response under the “never to commit” assumption. The central bar illustrates the optimal 
reaction of non-OECD when they have the option to join a carbon market after 2010. Any 
emission reduction compared to baseline would then be remunerated at the price of carbon in 
place within the coalition. In this case non-signatories have an almost immediate incentive to 
reduce their emissions in order to sell carbon credits on the international market. As expected, 
both engagements would motivate a proactive reaction even for a stricter targets that would 
otherwise lead to carbon leakage.  
 
Figure 4: Non-OECD CO2 cumulative emissions (2010-2100) when the OECD 2050 target is 45% 



















5.  Sensitivity to technology diffusion, elasticity of energy markets and climate change 
damages  
The paper shows that, in the presence of partial cooperation on emission reduction, 
technology spillovers can induce non-signatories to emit less carbon compared to their 
baseline, reducing the risk and the magnitude of carbon leakage, under certain conditions. As   29
this conclusion is the result of a numerical model, it is crucial to test its robustness to changes 
in all key parameters controlling the described effects We test the robustness of our 
conclusion to alternative assumptions concerning technology cost and climate change damage 
functions. We start from the key assumptions that have been identified by the literature on 
carbon leakage. Supply elasticities of fossil fuels play a pivotal role [12,27]. The potential for 
increasing or reducing emissions ultimately depends on the incentive to extract the 
exhaustible resources from the ground, which is a decision responding to non-linear increases 
in fossil fuel costs with cumulative extraction. When the supply is inelastic, the extraction of 
an additional marginal unit does not raise costs significantly. Therefore, the extent of a price 
increase associated with a larger demand is lower than in the case of elastic supply. In 
addition to fossil fuel elasticities, we have highlighted the role of the technology effect. 
Finally, we perform sensitivity to climate change damages, which are highly uncertain and 
yet another important factor influencing the response of non-signatory countries.  
Figure 5 shows non-OECD’s reaction when varying the assumptions on the most influential 
parameters controlling for fossil fuel supply elasticities, learning rates in carbon-free 
technologies, and the climate change damage perceived by non-signatory countries. We 
consider variations of these key parameters up to 20% around their central value.  
  
Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis to model parameterisation. Cumulative CO2 emissions with respect to 
the non cooperative baseline (2010-2100) in non-OECD countries when reacting to the optimal 
abatement in OECD countries. In red the central case and error bars show the plus and minus 20% 
variations.   30







When the elasticity of fossil fuel prices to cumulative extraction decreases, the leakage rate of 
a given level of emission reduction in the OECD region is higher, in line with previous 
studies (e.g., Burniaux and Oliveira Martins [12]). Non-OECD countries increase their fossil 
fuel demand more than they would in a world with higher elasticity, as the effect on prices is 
smaller. As a consequence, emissions are higher. The convex path of fossil fuel prices leads 
to an asymmetric effect. The range of variation due to different learning rates is quite 
substantial and when learning rates are 20% above their central value, emissions in non-
OECD countries can diminish more than 5% with respect to the non-cooperative baseline. 
The sensitivity to changes in climate damages can also be quite large, especially when 
forthcoming damages are (or perceived as) lower than expected. Asymmetry in the effect 
mainly depends on the non-linearity of damages. 
Overall, the sign of leakage can be reversed depending on the magnitude of each of the three 
effects. However, it is worth noticing that the rate of leakage remains contained even for very 
pessimistic assumptions of the parameters. The highest leakage rate, 15%, is observed when 
learning rates are low. 
 
6. Concluding remarks    31
A global approach to climate change, although warranted, has turned out to be slow and 
inefficient. Rather, a bottom-up mix of architectures has emerged in which regions pursue 
different, although to some degree homogeneous, domestic policies. A sort of de facto 
cooperation between major OECD countries is happening and developed economies have 
made spoken agreements on long-term common targets several times. However, they also 
share the common fear that, given unilateral action, the response of non-signatories could 
erode their mitigation action.  
This paper illustrates how an ensemble of factors drives the response of non-participatory 
countries: the perception of climate change damages, fossil fuel prices, and the efficacy of 
technology and knowledge transfers. Free-riding incentives and carbon leakage induce non-
members to increase emissions compared to their baseline behaviour. However, if 
innovations and technology advancements achieved within the coalition extend to non-
signatories, emissions can be reduced. Hence, a carefully and comprehensive analysis is 
crucial in order to evaluate whether paralysing concerns on carbon leakage are justified or 
not, and under what assumptions.   
The interplay of these three effects is accurately examined when a coalition between OECD 
countries is formed. Cost-benefit considerations would lead the OECD coalition to follow an 
abatement path entailing 2050 emissions 30-35% below 2005 levels. It is interesting to note 
that optimal short-run emissions are in line with the Annex I’s Copenhagen conditional 
pledges. Our study show that these pledges, often criticised for being too mild, have a very 
important implication: the reaction of non-OECD is proactive. Because international 
knowledge spillovers and technology transfers counterbalance the energy market effect, non-
OECD countries switch to cleaner technologies although not because part of the agreement, 
reducing their emissions compared to baseline.    32
Figure 6 reports the cumulative emission change in OECD and non-OECD countries 
compared to the no policy baseline in absolute terms for different OECD emission targets 
(labelled for the effort they entail in 2050 relative to 2005). By projecting each target on the 
y-axis one can read the global cumulative emission cut. As the OECD coalition becomes 
more ambitious by bringing 2050 emissions in the range of 40% below 2005 levels or more, 
the overall environmental effectiveness of their effort is actually lower than in the case of a 
35% target. Carbon leakage becomes negative because the energy market and damage effects 
prevail. Only when the OECD targets increase above ≥45% compared to 2005, does the 
overall effect match again that of the optimal target, as the OECD extra effort compensates 
the increase in emissions outside the coalition. This result is, however, reached in a strictly 
inefficient way, as it is more costly and it implies that non-participatory countries remain on 
an unsustainable growth path.   
 
Figure 6: OECD and non-OECD emission  strategies on each axis. The projection on 
the y-axis of each scenario represents the global emission cut. The box highlights the targets 
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Of course these are simulations results and should be taken with caution and a grain of salt. 
Nonetheless, the qualitative insights bear some relevant insight for the current debate on 
climate negotiations. Indeed, the present analysis weakens the concern that unilateral action is 
going to erode OECD country competitiveness and the environmental efficacy of the 
agreement. In addition, it points away from extremely aggressive mitigation targets as a 
potential solution. As long as the unilateral targets are moderate, near-term cooperation 
between technologically advanced countries could trigger a virtuous behaviour in non-
signatory countries as well.  
These results imply that effective policies to address carbon leakage should promote the 
international transfer of technologies rather than threaten border adjustment measures that 
might actually shut down important channels of diffusion, such as trade and FDI, and should 
not be used as a scapegoat for inaction. The international transmission of innovation to non-
signatory countries also reduces the risk of carbon leakage, suggesting that policies aiming at 
adjusting the regimes of intellectual property rights accordingly can play a very important 
role. For example, green tags that help to signal green ideas and entitle them to a fast track 
evaluation process could better serve the purpose of innovation diffusion..  
Given that developing countries, on the basis of ethical motivations, condition their decision 
to cooperate on the mitigation effort undertaken by industrialised countries, the OECD 
represents the appropriate starting coalition, to be followed by a subsequent enlargement of 
the coalition in the mid, longer-term future. By looking at a two-phase negotiation set-up,  we 
show that moderate future, but credible commitments by developing countries significantly 
mitigates the risk of carbon leakage associated with more ambitious targets in the OECD. 
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